Agony of Sorrow

自2014年莫迪領導的印度人民黨（BJP）上台以來，「大印度教主義」（Hindutva）作為其意識形態核心，逐步改變了印度國內政治與社會的結構。

1. 喀什米爾政策是制度性壓迫的象徵：

印度廢除憲法第370條，是將穆斯林多數的查謨-克什米爾地區全面納入「統一國家治理」的象徵性動作。這不只是一項行政變革，更是試圖打破當地穆斯林對自治、文化與宗教認同的憲政保障。

2. 人口結構與政治代表性的不對等：

在喀什米爾，儘管穆斯林占多數，但透過選區劃分與行政控制，當地政治代表性逐漸傾向印度教徒與中央政府的擁護者。這種控制被許多穆斯林視為殖民式的治理。

3. 穆斯林成為「內部他者」的代罪羔羊：

印度國內頻繁爆發針對穆斯林的暴力事件，例如牛肉禁令下的「私刑暴徒」、宗教衝突中的失控鎮壓等。在政治語境中，穆斯林常被描繪為「非印度價值」的代表。

4. 對巴基斯坦的指控具有高度政治動機：

印度一旦出現恐攻，執政當局傾向迅速指向「巴基斯坦支持的激進組織」。但實際上，這次事件是印度境內穆斯林社群對持續壓迫的反彈。將這些行動外部化，是一種政治轉移焦點的策略，尤其在選舉或民意低迷時期格外明顯。

5. 莫迪政府在「選舉國族主義」上的依賴：

2024年印度大選中BJP雖然勉強維持多數地位，但席次下滑，內部壓力上升。歷來在這種情況下，莫迪政府會尋求民族主義動員來鞏固基本盤，尤其是在安全、國防與「對外敵意」的議題上(比如與中國在藏南地區的多次衝突)。

印度內部對穆斯林的制度性邊緣化與壓迫，並不是單一事件的背景，而是一整套國家認同工程的展現。而當社會矛盾加劇時，外部敵人（如巴基斯坦、中國）往往成為民族主義敘事中最容易被利用的對象。

Since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power under Narendra Modi in 2014, “Hindutva”—or Hindu nationalism—has become the ideological core of the government, gradually reshaping India's political and social structures:

1. The Kashmir policy as a symbol of institutional oppression:
   India’s abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution was a symbolic move to fully integrate the Muslim-majority region of Jammu and Kashmir into a "unified national governance" framework. This was not merely an administrative change—it aimed to dismantle the region’s constitutional guarantees of autonomy, cultural identity, and religious recognition for its Muslim population.
2. Disparity in population structure and political representation:
   Despite Muslims being the majority in Kashmir, electoral redistricting and administrative control have increasingly skewed political representation in favor of Hindu residents and supporters of the central government. Many Muslims see this shift as a form of colonial-style governance.
3. Muslims as scapegoats and the internal 'Other':
   Violent incidents targeting Muslims have become frequent across India, including mob lynchings over beef consumption and state-sanctioned crackdowns during communal riots. In political discourse, Muslims are often portrayed as representatives of “anti-Indian values.”
4. Politically motivated accusations against Pakistan:
   Whenever a terrorist attack occurs, the Indian government is quick to blame "Pakistan-backed extremist groups." However, in this case, the incident reflects backlash from India’s own Muslim communities against systemic oppression. Externalizing such acts serves as a political distraction tactic, especially during election periods or times of low public approval.
5. Modi’s reliance on “electoral nationalism”:
   In the 2024 Indian general election, while the BJP narrowly retained a majority, it lost seats and now faces increased internal pressure. Historically, in such situations, the Modi government has turned to nationalist mobilization to consolidate its base—particularly by amplifying issues related to national security, defense, and hostility toward external enemies (such as repeated clashes with China in Arunachal Pradesh).

The systemic marginalization and oppression of Muslims within India is not the backdrop to a single event, but rather part of a broader national identity project. When internal social tensions escalate, external adversaries like Pakistan or China often become the most readily exploited targets in nationalist narratives.

巴基斯坦真的是無妄之災 - 事件發生在印度實控線境內，發動恐攻的是在印度的穆斯林，與巴基斯坦無關。

印度莫迪的大印度教主義，讓當地20%的印度教徒統治有80%穆斯林的地區，並且印度政府取消了喀什米爾邦的特殊自治地位，​這一舉措被視為對穆斯林多數地區的政治與文化權益的侵害。

事實上，自2014年莫迪上任以來，印度教民族主義勢力逐漸抬頭，印度教民族主義情緒高漲，導致對穆斯林的暴力事件頻發，印度這次升高態勢，大機率也是因為莫迪在大選結果中慘勝，所以需要能夠激發印度教民族主義的事件。

Pakistan is truly innocent this incident—the attack took place within Indian-controlled territory, and the perpetrators were Muslims residing in India, with no connection to Pakistan.

Indian Prime Minister Modi’s Greater Hindutva ideology has led to a situation where 20% Hindus dominate regions inhabited by 80% Muslims. Furthermore, the Indian government’s revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomous status has been widely seen as an infringement on the political and cultural rights of the Muslim-majority region.

In fact, since Modi took office in 2014, Hindu nationalism has been on the rise, with growing Hindu nationalist sentiment resulting in frequent acts of violence against Muslims. This latest escalation by India is likely due to Modi’s narrow victory in the elections, prompting the need for an incident that could stoke Hindu nationalist fervor.

補充說明：

在2024年印度大選中，總理莫迪領導的印度人民黨（BJP）雖然成功連任，但僅獲得240席，未能達到其預期的400席目標，並未能單獨過半，這一結果被視為「慘勝」。​主要原因可歸結為以下幾點：

1. 高失業率與貧富差距

儘管莫迪政府提出了雄心勃勃的發展願景，選民卻更關注實際的經濟問題。​高失業率、物價上漲以及農村地區的貧困問題使得選民對政府的經濟政策產生疑慮。​例如，北方邦的選民將票投給了左翼的社會主義黨，反映出對BJP政策的不滿。

2. 宗教極化與社會對立

BJP在選舉期間強調印度教優先的議題，並在阿尤德亞重建羅摩神廟等措施，試圖激發印度教選民的支持。​然而，這些舉措引發了穆斯林社群的不滿，並加劇了社會的宗教對立。​選民對這種極化的宗教言論感到厭倦，轉而支持強調社會包容與多元的政黨。​

3. 反對派的崛起與選民的反彈

印度國大黨在選舉中取得99席，較上屆大幅增長，顯示出反對派的崛起。​此外，反對派領袖的被捕和財務打壓引發了選民的同情，進一步削弱了BJP的支持基礎。​選民對BJP的統治方式感到不滿，轉而支持更具包容性的政黨。

4. 選舉策略的失敗

BJP在選舉期間過度依賴民族主義和宗教議題，忽視了經濟和社會問題。​這種策略未能有效吸引年輕人和低收入群體的支持，反而使其支持基礎出現流失。​選民希望政府更加關注實際問題，而非僅僅強調宗教和民族議題。​

莫迪政府在2024年大選中的「慘勝」反映出選民對其政策的複雜態度。​儘管在某些領域取得了一定的成就，但在經濟發展、社會包容和選舉策略等方面的不足，導致其支持基礎的流失。​未來，BJP需要在這些方面進行調整，以維持其在印度政治中的主導地位。